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 Toward a More Comprehensive
 Theory of Food Labels
 Julie A. Caswell and Daniel I. Padberg
 Food labels play important third-party roles in the food marketing system through their
 impact on product design, advertising, consumer confidence in food quality, and
 consumer education on diet and health. However, current analysis focuses
 overwhelmingly on the label's direct use as a point-of-purchase shopping aid, even
 though such use is limited by consumers' information processing abilities and time. In
 rewriting label regulations, policy makers should consider the benefits and costs of the
 broad array of roles labels serve, with evaluation of alternative regimes based on their
 impacts on consumer behavior and seller strategy.
 Key words: consumer information, firm strategy, food labels.
 A consensus emerged in the early 1990s on the
 need for a general overhaul of labeling require-
 ments for food products (see, e.g., U.S. De-
 partment of Health and Human Services 1990a,
 1990b; National Academy of Sciences 1990,
 1991). The central argument of the present ar-
 ticle is that, in rewriting label regulations, pol-
 icy makers should consider the benefits and costs
 of several important roles that labels play be-
 yond their direct use as a consumer shopping
 aid. These nonuse and third-party roles place in-
 creased emphasis on label design by explicitly
 recognizing a label's impact on product design,
 advertising, consumer confidence in food qual-
 ity, and consumer education on diet and health.
 A broadening of the conceptual framework for
 analyzing food labeling is particularly timely
 since federal legislation passed in November 1990
 requires that new Food and Drug Administration
 (FDA) regulations on nutritional labeling and
 health claims be in place during 1992. We pur-
 sue this broadening by analyzing the role of in-
 formation, particularly labeling, in consumer
 goods markets and the scope of and justifica-
 tions for current food labeling regulations. We
 then discuss the limits of food labels as point-
 of-purchase shopping aids and the important third-
 party roles of food labels. The article concludes
 with a framework for weighing the benefits and
 costs of alternative regulatory regimes.
 Labeling as Consumer Information
 The pending update of food labeling regulations
 will be based on the striking consensus that has
 emerged in recent years on dietary recommen-
 dations aimed at controlling diet-related disease
 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
 vices 1988, National Academy of Sciences 1989).
 However, disagreement exists over the degree
 and manner in which food labeling should at-
 tempt to foster adoption of recommended di-
 etary practices. Even less consensus exists on
 whether labels should be used to transmit in-
 formation on issues such as microbial food safety,
 pesticide residues, use of irradiation, and agri-
 cultural practices (e.g., use of biotechnology-
 based inputs such as bovine somatotropin).
 What current discussions have in common is
 an overwhelming focus on seeing the label pri-
 marily, or even exclusively, as an item of direct
 consumer information (see, e.g., National
 Academy of Sciences 1991). As such, labels are
 a part of the information set used by consumers
 in making product selections. This information
 set also includes prior experience; media adver-
 tising; word-of-mouth information; and general
 dietary education programs carried out by gov-
 ernment, health professionals, or private groups.
 Consumer products have been usefully cate-
 gorized as search, experience, or credence goods
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 based on the timing and types of quality infor-
 mation available to consumers (Nelson; Darby
 and Karni). For search goods, the consumer can
 accurately ascertain the product's quality before
 purchase. The quality of experience goods can
 only be judged after purchase and use. With cre-
 dence goods, quality cannot be accurately judged
 even after purchase and use and, thus, must be
 taken on faith. For food products, this categor-
 ization is even more useful when it is applied to
 attributes of goods rather than the goods them-
 selves (Zellner). Thus a tomato has search (e.g.,
 color), experience (e.g., taste), and credence
 (e.g., levels of micronutrients) attributes.
 Information in the form of labels, advertising,
 word-of-mouth information, and general edu-
 cation programs can contribute to the complete-
 ness and accuracy of a consumer's assessment
 of all three types of attributes. The central reg-
 ulatory issue regarding consumer information is
 the degree to which private markets provide full
 and accurate information to consumers (Beals,
 Craswell, and Salop; Zellner). Many food mar-
 kets do not conform well to the conditions of
 perfect competition. In these markets, there are
 technically complex products; nutritional and food
 safety attributes are not detectable by the senses
 or are obscured by significant processing or in-
 gredient combinations; advertising is important
 in establishing and maintaining product value;
 and convenience, packaging, and style are im-
 portant to the product's quality image. These are
 typically markets in which quality information
 is asymmetric and in which competition among
 sellers is expressed in use of advertising and new
 product introductions rather than in price rivalry
 (Connor et al., chapters 3 and 5).
 Under certain circumstances, private markets,
 regardless of market imperfections, may pro-
 vide reasonably full information without regu-
 lation. Grossman models such a case where it
 is assumed that manufacturers can make ex post
 verifiable claims, that they never lie, and that
 consumers know manufacturers will make the
 most favorable claims possible for their prod-
 ucts, short of lying. Manufacturers who can make
 a quality claim will do so and consumers will
 assume that any firm not making a claim has
 low quality. Thus consumers can ascertain a
 product's attributes before purchase by simply
 examining the producer's claims. This "unfold-
 ing process" is attractive, since it places the
 fewest constraints on manufacturers' practices
 while still providing full, accurate information.
 And some support for it is offered by Ippolito
 and Mathios' recent work on fiber content claims
 or re dy-to-eat cereals.' However, the unfold-
 ing process requires that consumers have a great
 deal of i for ation and make specific assump-
 tions, tha  they know claims are being made,
 that the claims will be truthful, and that any
 product not making the claim must be of low
 quality.
 Federal regulators have been reluctant to rely
 on free market mechanisms to provide con-
 sumers with adequate and accurate label infor-
mation on food products. Federal law (e.g., the
 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 19662) pre-
 sumes that search economies will be gained by
 providing consumers with information in stan-
 dard formats, wh ch an unregulated market is
not likely to accomplish. In addition, federal
regulation often sets x ante information stan-
 dards in order to li it the size of the enforce-
 ment job in detectin  and prosecuting deceptive
 claims.
 Federal regulations require labels to convey
 i formation on both objective and subjective food
 product characteristics.3 They mandate numer-
 ous affirmative disclosures of objective char-
 acteristics such as weight or volume, ingredi-
 ents, and name of manufacturer or distributor.
 They also dictate the location and size of many
 information pieces on the label. Other types of
 objective information have been required under
 certain circumstances, for example, nutrition la-
 beling where any nutritional claim is made.4 They
 have also, from time to time, regulated use of
 particular terms such as "low sodium." Health
 claims were in effect prohibited prior to 1984
 (Hutt), but were widely allowed throughout the
 ate 1980s. Beyond affirmative disclosure re-
 quirements, the FDA also enforces a broad neg-
 ative mandate that food labels must not be false
 or misleading in any particular.
 A manufacturer's strategic use of product la-
 bels to differentiate its products must be done
within the confines of federal label regulations.
 These regulations form a playing field upon which
 manufacturers maneuver for position vis-a-vis
 their competitors (Caswell and Johnson). From
 1 In the case of fiber claims for ready-to-eat cereals, manufac-
 turers are presumably constrained from lying by FDA regulation of
 false label claims.
 2 As this law applies to food products, see 21 CFR Part 1.
 3 The federal regulatory system for food labels is complex, with
 the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) having authority over
 meat and poultry products and FDA regulating most other products.
 A detailed description of this system is not central to the arguments
 presented here. The interested reader is referred to Kushner et al.
 and National Academy of Sciences (1990).
 4 Federal legislation passed in 1990 will make nutritional labeling
 mandatory for most food products.
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 the manufacturer's viewpoint, limited regula-
 tion is desirable for maximum flexibility but too
 much freedom can be detrimental if it allows
 numerous false claims that undermine the cred-
 ibility of manufacturers' communications.
 Here we focus on the subset of labeling reg-
 ulations that is largely aimed at changing (im-
 proving) American diets. The subset includes
 regulation of nutrition labeling, health claims,
 and warning labels. To this point, labeling has
 been treated as direct consumer information, with
 the federal government intervening in the two-
 party relationship between seller and buyer to
 remedy information imperfections and failures.
 Our purpose, however, is to see food labeling
 policy in a broader context. We proceed by dis-
 cussing the limits of labels as direct shopping
 aids and by focusing on the additional third-party
 roles that labels play. The latter roles have im-
 pacts on the food marketing system even with-
 out widespread consumer use of labels in mak-
 ing product selections. Some of these impacts
 occur because a small but active consumer seg-
 ment uses labels (Padberg), but others can occur
 even if consumers do not use labels as shopping
 aids.
 The Limits of Labels as Direct Shopping
 Aids
 As shopping aids, food labels add to consumers'
 information base and help guide buying deci-
 sions. They may make markets work more ef-
 ficiently as competition among firms, in an im-
 proved information environment, awards success
 to products with the best (most preferred) attri-
 butes. The label becomes an instrument of con-
 sumer sovereignty. Modem behavior and mar-
 ket conditions bring stress and distortion to this
 idealized picture (Food Marketing Institute). The
 consumer is often harried and hurried, and gro-
 cery shopping logistics limit the potential for
 significant use of label information in making
 purchase decisions.
 Limits on consumers' information processing
 abilities in the supermarket stem from several
 related sources. First, periodic surveys by the
 Point-of-Purchase Advertising Institute indicate
 that consumers make as many as two-thirds of
 final purchase decisions in-store (Food Institute
 Report). Second, the average consumer makes
 one major shopping trip per week, spending about
 an hour in the store (Meloy, McLaughlin, and
 Kramer; American Demographics). Thus the
 consumer evaluates the over 15,000 products
 offered by the typical store on complex nutri-
 tion, taste, convenience, and price criteria in a
 limited period of time. Research on grocery
 shopping behavior indicates that decision-mak-
 ing quality deteriorates when the shopper is un-
 der time pressure (Park, Iyer, and Smith). Third,
 other survey data suggest that consumers dislike
 grocery shopping (American Demographics).
 These factors limit many consumers' use of la-
 bels as shopping aids.
 Food labels' impact on purchase decisions is
 also circumscribed because labels are only one
 element, and not the most prominent or easy to
 use one, in a broader set of consumer product
 information. Advertising is another major source
 of such information. Eight of the nation's twelve
 largest advertisers in 1990 were major sellers of
 food products (Advertising Age). The largest spent
 over $5.6 million per day influencing consumer
 choice, while the smallest spent almost $2 mil-
 lion per day. It is estimated that a third of food
 advertising spending now carries some kind of
 health claim (Hilts). In these markets, the seller
 influences the buyer and is also often large
 enough to influence the market as a whole. This
 is clearly a "second best" situation, where gov-
 ernment labeling regulation to make the market
 conform more narrowly to the perfect informa-
 tion ideal may or may not yield welfare im-
 provements.
 Consumers also receive diet and health guide-
 lines from the medical professions, government,
 and health and consumer advocacy groups. The
 news media prominently reports these guide-
 lines and recent research results. However, some
 diet and health information is at a level of tech-
 nical complexity that is generally inaccessible to
 consumers. As the controversy over oat bran il-
 lustrates, conflicting information may reach the
 consumer from diverse sources.
 In this context, it is not enough to see labels
 simply as direct consumer information. This is
 not to detract from food labels' recognized value
 as such, particularly to consumers (e.g., allergy
 sufferers, those on special diets, the health-con-
 scious) who frequently use labels for purchase
 d cisions. Nor is it to lament a loss of consumer
 sov reignty. Many consumer products have
 complex technical properties. To avoid over-
 load, consumers choose not to be fully "in-
 formed" on all their purchases. The point is that
 the use of labels to effect changes in the Amer-
 ican diet faces limits when the mechanism by
 which this change is to be realized is con-
 sumers' direct use of labels as shopping aids. A
 broader view indicates, however, that there are
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 additional mechanisms, namely the third-party
 roles of labels, for pursuing this goal.
 Third-Party Roles of Food Labels
 In the broader approach, labels are designed for
 their impact on the whole food marketing sys-
 tem rather than simply as consumer informa-
 tion. An example illustrates the difference. The
 Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)
 recently proposed a food label reform that com-
 bines a revamped nutrition information panel with
 a system of stoplights (red, yellow, and green)
 on the product's principal display panel
 (Schmidt). The stoplights would give con-
 sumers a quick summary of whether the product
 has a desirable profile of fat, sodium, and fiber
 content. Suppose the label reformer adopted the
 stoplight system without the supplementary nu-
 trition information panel. Such a system might
 serve well the goal of improving the label's use-
 fulness as a shopping aid, since it provides easy-
 to-understand information. But the stoplights'
 very summary nature would limit their impact
 on manufacturers' incentives to produce health-
 ier products. This approach would be compa-
 rable to changing the federal government's au-
 tomobile mileage rating system from exact miles
 per gallon to "less than 20," "20 to 40," and
 "40 and over." The competitive reaction would
 be around the change between categories rather
 than throughout the entire range (Beals, Cras-
 well, and Salop).
 Label reform should relate to the broad array
 of purposes labels serve rather than exclusively
 to their consumer point-of-purchase information
 role. These additional third-party roles are as a
 significant product-design influence, an adver-
 tising franchise, a public surveillance assurance,
 a public values definition, and a nutrition and
 food safety education format. We discuss these
 roles beginning with those we believe to be key.
 A Significant Product Design Influence
 Once established, labeling regulations signifi-
 cantly influence product formulation and refor-
 mulation. Food processors may design a product
 to use a defined label term, such as "low so-
 dium," or reformulate a product to give better
 numbers in an important label category, such as
 fiber. They may also avoid using particular in-
 gredients so they will not have to be listed on
 the label. For example, many cookie and cracker
 companies reformulated their products to ex-
 clude use of p lm oil and lard. This influence
 can occur even in the absence of widespread
 consumer label use in making purchase deci-
 sions (Putler and Frazao). All that is required is
 that a population segment or its consumer ad-
 vocates read labels an  use o  publicize what
 they find.
 Label disclosu e's i fluence on product de-
 sign is explicitly recognized by many advocates
 of increased label information. A case in point
 is California's Proposition 65,5 which estab-
 lishes a duty to warn consumers prior to expo-
 sure to certain carcinogens and reproductive
 toxins (Phipps, Allen, and Caswell). Analysts
 who question such warnings argue that they are
 a very cumbersome and ineffective way to in-
 form consumers about potentially risky products
 or ingredients (Viscusi). They view the warn-
 ings primarily as a shopping aid and find them
 deficient in this role.
 Proposition 65's proponents argue that the
 initiative's success will not rest on the effec-
 tiveness of point-of-purchase product warnings
 as shopping aids. Rather, they anticipate that
 manufacturers will reformulate products to
 eliminate ingredients requiring warnings or stop
 marketing products with such ingredients (Roe,
 Roberts). Thus Proposition 65 could be a suc-
 cess without a single label warning ever ap-
 pearing (Wall Street Journal). Opponents fo-
 cusing on the warning as shopping aid may
 entirely miss this point.
 Conscious use of labeling to influence prod-
 uct design requires an awareness of food com-
 panies' marketing strategies. Such an approach
 might be to develop a scoring system that fo-
cuses on a limited number of important cate-
 gories such as "heart healthy," "variety," and
 "weight control." Within each category, a com-
 parative scoring system could be developed that
 awards high scores for product attributes that
 conform to accepted nutritional guidelines. Some
 attributes (e.g., fat composition) might be ele-
 ments of more than one category.
 As an example, consider the rating system
 shown in table 1. The "heart healthy" category
 is subdivided into three dimensions: amount of
 fat, kind of fat, and sodium level. Scores for
 each of these dimensions are then weighted to
 5 California's Proposition 65 led to passage of the Safe Drinking
 Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. In enforcing this act,
 California initially adopted FDA standards for carcinogens and re-
 productive toxins in food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices.
 Therefore, the law has not yet been applied directly to food label-
 ing.
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 Table 1. A Rating System for the "Heart Healthy" Attributes of Food Products
 Rating score
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 Percent of calories from fat 100 95 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
 Ratio of unsaturated to total fat .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .95 1.0
 Sodium, milligrams per serving 700 600 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100
 create a composite index. The weighted scores
 are as follows: amount of fat at 0.45, type of
 fat at 0.25, and sodium level at 0.30. The prod-
 uct's composite index is
 HEART HEALTHY
 = (Amount of Fat Score)(0.45)
 + (Type of Fat Score)(0.25)
 + (Sodium Score)(0.30)
 In line with consensus nutrition guidelines, foods
 with a high level of fat, saturated fat, and so-
 dium would have a low index rating. Such a rat-
 ing system encourages manufacturers to, in ef-
 fect, "implement the guidelines" or be stuck with
 a bad score. It also places a much smaller pre-
 mium on informing the entire population, since
 improved (from a nutritional standpoint) prod-
 uct offerings may be attained without most con-
 sumers having a detailed knowledge of how the
 scores are constructed and with only a small
 number using the scores in making purchase de-
 cisions.
 The construction by experts of such dimen-
 sional ratings involves judgments. For example,
 the consensus target level for percentage of cal-
 ories from fat has been set at 30%, which in the
 present index receives a score of only 80. This
 score is chosen because foods lower than the ag-
 gregate target are desirable in order to balance
 those with a higher percentage of calories from
 fat. It is also known that experts would have
 liked to set a target lower than 30%, but felt it
 to be unrealistic at this time.
 Ippolito and Mathios' research in the cereal
 industry and Putler and Frazao's on fat con-
 sumption in the general population suggest that
 such information could have a powerful impact
 on product design. The impact could be en-
 hanced by recalibrating the rating systems over
 time to insure steady but continual improvement
 in average product offerings. Some may recoil
 from such a system, believing it has overtones
 of Big Brother involvement in consumer prod-
 uct choices. Experience with tobacco-related la-
 beling, advertising, and education programs
 (Ippolito and Ippolito) indicates, however, that
 use of leverage over consumer choices may be
 accep able when it has clear health benefits.
 With current information, we cannot fully as-
 sess the consequences of such a labeling ar-
 rangement, although an assessment framework
 is described below. If the system could yield
 improvements in the American diet, its devel-
 opment would appear to be worthwhile. It might
 also induce advertising information to be set more
 firmly in the context of accepted nutritional
 guidelines (see below). These would be pow-
 erful results. They are worthy of a considerable
 investment in theoretical and empirical re-
 search.
 The scoring approach has serious potential
 drawbacks. The major drawback is that what is
 important to health is the whole composition of
 a person's diet, not the nutritional profile of in-
dividual foods that make up the diet. FDA and
USDA ar  concerned that rating systems ob-
 scure this fact, miseducating consumers about
 link  between nutrition and health (Lipman
 1990a, 1990b). Based on these concerns, FDA
 and USDA have strongly discouraged private
 nutritional rating or "seal of approval" pro-
 grams. For example, in 1989-90 the American
 Heart Association proposed a seal of approval
 for products meeting its guidelines for fats, cho-
 lesterol, and sodium. Regulators and others were
 particularly concerned that some products would
 receive approval seals because they had better
 profiles than others in their class, even though
 the class itself was not particularly healthy. For
 example, margarine might merit a seal when
 compared to butter but both belong to the class
 of fats, whose consumption should not be en-
 couraged. These concerns related to label and
 rating system design would have to be resolved
 if more active use is to be made of labels to
 influence product design.
 An Advertising Franchise
 Food labels and media advertising are closely
 linked because firms coordinate label and ad-
 vertising messages to produce a consistent prod-
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 uct image. However, regulatory jurisdiction over
 the two message types is split, with the FDA
 and USDA regulating labels and the Federal
 Trade Commission (FTC) regulating advertis-
 ing. In many circumstances, label regulations
 establish parameters for advertising, in effect
 creating and limiting the franchise to advertise
 based on diet and health relationships. For ex-
 ample, nutritional labeling is currently volun-
 tary, except when a product is advertised or la-
 beled with any nutritional claim or information.
 While modest in its reach, the policy has a
 straightforward and appealing logic. Where
 claims are made, the manufacturer must provide
 nutritional information in a standardized format,
 allowing consumers to directly evaluate the claim.
 This system provides a credible verification
 mechanism where consumers cannot assume that
 every advertising and labeling claim is truthful.
 Health claims are a second area where FDA
 label policy has had a strong controlling influ-
 ence over the scope of food advertising. Prior
 to 1987 (Hutt), health claims were generally il-
 legal, because they triggered the FDA to eval-
 uate the food product under its very stringent
 drug safety and efficacy standards. Given this
 stance, few firms ventured to make such claims
 on labels or, consequently, in their advertising.
 Health-claims advertising exploded after 1987
 when FDA relaxed its label-claims regulation.
 Thus, while advertising is regulated indepen-
 dently by the FTC, the FDA's label regulations
 play a key role in setting the parameters for ac-
 ceptable claims. Through their link to advertis-
 ing, label regulations affect the entire set of con-
 sumer product information. Label reform should
 seek to manage this third-party role of food la-
 bel regulations in creating an advertising fran-
 chise.
 A Public Surveillance Assurance
 Consumers may value the presence of compre-
 hensive labeling independently of the value they
 place on labels as a direct shopping aid. Lena-
 han et al.'s early study of consumer reaction to
 the proposed nutritional labeling format fully
 implemented in 1975 found that many people
 liked the label's existence even though they did
 not use it. McCullough and Padberg found a
 similar pattern in a study of consumer reaction
 to unit pricing in supermarkets.
 In resource economists' language, food labels
 have option and existence values separate from
 their direct use value. The option value stems
 from the availab lity f the label, should the
 consumer decide to use it. The existence value
 can be interpret d as a fe ling of consumer as-
 surance that someone is watch ng over the pre-
 sentation of food products. This urveillance
 signals to consumers that they can have confi-
 dence in the food supply's quality. While per-
 haps difficult to measure except through contin-
 gent valuation methodology, label regulations'
 value in terms of g nerating consumer confi-
dence in the food supply nd the reliability of
 food labels is important.
 A Public V lues Definiti n/Forum for
 Consensus
 Regulators' choice of the required information
 on food labels and the format used signals to
 consumers, distributors, and manufacturers which
 of the product's attributes are key and which
 values make a difference. Any label reform
 crystallizes, for a significant period of time, a
 set of judgments on what is important in the areas
 of nutrition and diet-related disease prevention.
 The process of making these judgements serves
 as a forum for building expert consensus (e.g.,
 Nat onal Academy of Sciences 1990).
 The prominence of this signaling role varies
 among food products. Traditionally, labels have
 b en least important and least used on staple
 foods. Frozen vegetables, for example, involve
 ewer nutritional issues or concerns than more
 proces ed and formulated foods. They are not
 complex products and most consumers under-
 stand their food group placement, as stressed by
 nutrition education. In addition, relatively little
 advertising is involved in the consumer's efforts
 to understand this product. By contrast, highly
 processed or formulated foods, such as snacks
 or prepared entr6es, are less classifiable by sta-
 ple origin or experience. They are also products
 that are most heavily advertised. They represent
 the most convenient way to eat and have be-
 come a large part of the American diet. It is here
 th t food labels play a more important signaling
 role, particularly for diet-conscious consumers.
 Parallels can be drawn to other consumer
 products. Label requirements for automobiles and
 cigarettes contain objective measurements of at-
 tributes seen to be important to the public, such
 as price information and miles per gallon for cars
 and nicotine and tar for cigarettes (Ippolito and
 Ippolito). In revamping food labels, crucial de-
 cisions on relative emphasis must be made with
 an eye to the signals transmitted to consumers
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 and industry. This is label reform's heart and is
 where consensus must be found before more
 technical issues, such as use of pie versus bar
 graphs, are tackled. The regulator must make
 this decision knowing that it will have impacts
 on label format, product formulation, advertis-
 ing, and consumer's image of particular prod-
 ucts.
 A Nutrition and Food Safety Education
 Format
 The traditional nutrition education format has
 been to classify foods into four groups based
 largely on animal or plant origin. Staple foods
 are relatively easy for the consumer to place in
 this system. It works less well for complex
 products such as formulated or fortified foods,
 combination products such as frozen dinners, and
 many snack items. Advertising is heaviest for
 these products.
 As complex foods become a larger part of the
 American diet, the traditional nutrition educa-
 tion format (and definition of nutritional values)
 becomes obsolete. The 1975 nutritional label
 format provided the beginning of a definition of
 nutritional values independent of animal or plant
 origin. Recent guidelines go much further in this
 direction (National Academy of Sciences 1989,
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 1988). New label regulations need to recognize
 labels' third-party role in reenforcing other forms
 of nutrition education at the consumer level
 (National Academy of Sciences 1990, 1991). It
 will be a tremendous advantage for label format
 to be designed with an explicit view toward use
 in educational programs. Product labels which
 fall short of this standard exact a cost in edu-
 cational program effectiveness and consumer
 confusion. While our argument focuses on nu-
 trition education, it applies as well to food safety
 education. Labels may soon play a larger role
 in informing consumers about potential product
 risks and proper handling methods. Here, too,
 we should expect considerable synergism be-
 tween labels and other educational programs.
 A Proposed Framework for Evaluating
 Alternative Labeling Regimes
 The existing conceptual approach to food prod-
 uct labels evaluates their impact in terms of a
 role as consumer "point-of-purchase" informa-
 tion. We argue that food labels have additional
 third-party roles growing out of the info mation
 dynamics of modem food markets. A required
 disclosure may change the attitude of the con-
 sumer or consumer advocate (even if consumers
 do not read or understand it) and may change
 the sellers' strategy. We envision the develop-
 ment and implementation of policy that recog-
 nizes and exploits all the roles labels play.
 At this point, we suggest the development and
 empirical testing of a more comprehensive the-
 ory of food labeling. This research has imme-
 diate application in a benefit/cost framework for
 evaluating alternative labeling regulations. The
 appropriate approach is to compare the social
 benefits and costs of alternative regimes with an
 additional focus on distributional issues. Distri-
 butional impacts are particularly important in
 view of recent research suggesting that some de-
 mographic segments are disproportionately
 reached by diet and health information (Ippolito
 and Mathios, Putler and Frazao).
 We argue that potential sources of benefits
from nutritional and health claim label regula-
 tion have been too narrowly conceived. The
 benefits will be largely manifested in welfare in-
 creases because of improved health status (re-
 ducti ns in mortality or morbidity). The theo-
 retically preferred methodology for valuing such
 improvements is to measure consumer willing-
 ness-to-pay for the associated benefits. Alter-
 nat v  methodologies that value costs of illness,
 loss of productivity, and other costs of impaired
 health status offer useful but less comprehensive
 benefit measures (Landefeld and Seskin, Rob-
 erts and Foegeding).
 Benefits valuation for labeling regulations is
 complex: diet is only one determinant of health
 status, nutritional attributes are but one factor in
 food choice, and labels are only one information
 source on food products' nutritional attributes.
 Despite these complexities, alternative nutri-
 ional and health claim regulatory regimes should
 be evaluated according to their impact on con-
 sumers' decisions and firms' incentives to de-
 sign and merchandise products with different
 health profiles.
 In prior studies, costs of labeling regulations
 may also have been too narrowly conceived,
 primarily as compliance costs. Recent work by
 French and Neighbors suggests that such com-
 pliance costs, while sometimes large, can typi-
 cally be absorbed in the normal label-change
 cycle if the compliance period is sufficiently long.
 No empirical estimates are available on the
 broader economic costs society may incur from
 loss of business flexibility, or potential loss of
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 consumer product choice associated with more
 extensive labeling regulation. Comprehensive
 evaluation of alternative labeling regimes re-
 quires quantifying these costs.
 While we would like to offer better evidence
 on the importance of food labels' third-party
 roles, such evidence is simply not yet available.
 The framework described here offers an ap-
 proach for developing that evidence. In the
 meantime, it is important that these roles be rec-
 ognized both in forming the research agenda and
 in the significant episode of policy formulation
 now underway.
 [Received March 1990; final revision received
 September 1991.]J
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